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ABSTRACT
The relationship between the nation-building mission in Afghanistan
and that country’s connection with its influential neighbor Pakistan
is very complex. The success of NATO’s strategy to strengthen the
new Kabul regime depends on its intersection with Pakistani poli-
cies. Pakistan’s strategy in Afghanistan, in turn, is tied to its broad-
er security policy against India. This is complicated by Afghan-
Pakistan disputes over territory, Afghan refusal to recognize the
Durand Line as the international border, Pakistan’s interdiction of
third-party trade to and from Afghanistan, and a history of Afghan
sponsorship of secessionism in Pakistan. All of these factors con-
tribute to Pakistan’s reluctance to contribute to the stabilization of
Afghanistan by closing the insurgent sanctuaries in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas. NATO has few non-escalatory military
options. It has two remaining venues of influence. First, its presence
acts as a restraint on Afghan provocation of secessionism, thereby
satisfying one of Islamabad’s goals. Second, NATO could offer trade
and aid incentives to Pakistan to gradually withdraw its support to
those elements of its society that foment Pakhtun insurgency in
Afghanistan (and Pakistan). The long-term effect of such a strategy
would be a gradual economic integration and normalization of the
Afghan and Pakistan frontier areas.
INTRODUCTION
Outcomes in world politics are the result of the interaction of competing
strategies. NATO’s primary strategy in Afghanistan is to strengthen the indige-
nous capacity of the Kabul regime to supplant Islamists with pretensions towards
global jihad. The outcome of the strategy, however, depends on its intersection
with Pakistani policies. Pakistan’s strategy in Afghanistan is tied to its broader
security policy against India, which revolves around the threat Afghanistan poses
to the outflanking of the Indus River, a component of Pakistan’s riverine defense
system.1 This is reinforced by local Afghan-Pakistan disputes over Pakhtun and
Baloch territory, the Afghan non-recognition of the Durand Line as the interna-
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tional frontier, Pakistan’s interdiction of third-party trade to and from
Afghanistan, and a history of Afghan sponsorship of secessionism in Pakistan,
which contribute to a reluctance by Pakistan to contribute to the stabilization of
Afghanistan by closing the insurgent sanctuaries.2 Particularly since the loss of
East Pakistan in 1971 and the uprising of the Baloch in the 1970s and 2000s,
Pakistan views foreign involvement in its intra-Islamic communal fighting as an
existential threat. This study therefore considers the key factors at play in
Pakistan’s policy toward the NATO mission in Afghanistan by examining
Pakistan’s strategic interests, key actors, the causes of Pakistan’s inactivity, and
concludes with a consideration of likely courses of action by Pakistan and
NATO. This paper suggests that given the general volatility of the issues at stake,
only a very gradual and non-provocative policy will have any chance of success.
Pakistan’s Strategic Interests in Afghanistan
Pakistan’s objective interest in Central Asia is to secure it as a position of
depth for both the stationing of vulnerable military assets and the passage of mil-
itary supplies, in the event of hostilities with India. During the 1965 Indo-
Pakistan War, King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan permitted sanctuary for the civil
aircraft of Pakistan International Airlines and the passage of supplies from Iran
and elsewhere to Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan’s provinces of Balochistan and the
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) provide reserve air bases and cantonments
for some of its corps. This ‘depth’ is not a lateral communications system facili-
tating strategic redeployment due to the absence of developed infrastructure or a
base for retreated forces since, by then, Pakistan will have abandoned most of its
population and industrial base.
Afghan-Pakistan relations are undermined however by the status of the
Pakhtun people, whose territory straddles the frontier and whose leaders have a
decisive influence in Kabul (accounting for half of Afghanistan’s thirty million
people) and are second in their importance in Islamabad (after the Punjabis),
where their population accounts for fifteen percent of Pakistan’s population of
160 million. Pakistan’s reluctance to grant concessions on the basis of principles
of self-determination led to Afghanistan’s refusal to recognize Pakistan at parti-
tion, Pakistan’s retaliatory closure of third-party trade for land-locked
Afghanistan, and Afghanistan’s military attacks from the late 1940s until 1963.
Pakistan’s basis of legitimacy is as the home for Muslims in South Asia, which
has led the state to foster a pervasive ideology of Islam to cement together its dis-
parate ethnic constituents. 
Within this context, Pakistan’s ideal interest of a supportive Muslim neigh-
bor is unstable and would inevitably be undermined by its ongoing dispute over
Pakhtunistan. Stable relations were achieved twice. After over ten years of mili-
tary clashes along the Pakistan-Afghan border between 1947 and 1963, which
culminated in a series of war scares involving Afghan military mobilization,
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Afghan King Nadir Shah succeeded in an abrupt policy shift that normalized
relations with Pakistan. A number of ruinous trade cut-offs by Pakistan and
repeated mediation efforts by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, led Kabul to set
aside its demand for immediate change to the status quo in Pakhtunistan.
Reasonably good relations prevailed between 1963 and 1973 until an internal
coup deposed the Afghan monarchy and threatened fresh hostilities with Pakistan
which thereafter sponsored various Islamist movements to undermine the Kabul
government. The second instance of good relations followed the seizure of Kabul
by the Taliban in 1996 through to 2001. The latter regime did not acquiesce to
Pakistan’s goals of recognition of the Durand Line, but it did eliminate official
sponsorship of Pakhtun separatist activism.3
Taliban rule from 1996 neutralized anti-Pakistan agitation in Afghanistan
but did so with obvious sponsorship from Islamabad. Though Pakistan could
help the Taliban seize Kabul, they could not then get it to deliver recognition of
the Durand Line. Pakistan is not currently in a position, given NATO’s presence,
to compel Kabul’s compliance with its goals. Arguably, the cordial period of
Afghan-Pakistan relations since 2001 has been made possible by the restraining
effect of NATO’s presence on Kabul’s irredentist activism. The remaining peri-
ods are of Afghan-Pakistan hostility, involve limited military action, and charac-
terize relations from partition in 1947 to 1963 and from 1973 until the establish-
ment of the Taliban regime in 2001.
Pakistan’s immediate strategy is to avoid transparent negotiations and to
emphasize its lack of freedom of action for three reasons. First, it is fearful that
direct negotiations with NATO or Afghanistan regarding the frontier sanctuaries
could lead to consideration of self-determination for the Pakhtun and Baloch
people there as a means of reducing the effects of Islamist influence. Second,
Pakistan cannot obtain any concessions from Afghanistan as long as NATO is
backing the Kabul regime. Third, Pakistan does not want to break the Islamist
movement that is countering Pakhtun separatism. Pakistan’s current Afghan
strategy is therefore to play for time until NATO scales back its commitment and
Islamabad can more directly pressure Kabul.
Actors, Interests, and Democracy 
The principal Pakistani political actors with interests in Afghan policy can
be grouped twofold into the traditional ruling elite of Pakistan and the Pakhtun
and Baloch ethnic minorities. As a corporate entity, the traditional political elite
relies on Islam to suppress ethnic nationalism and leftists both within Pakistan
and against its neighbors in India and Afghanistan.4 This is also in part to co-opt
religious groups since traditional Islamic organizations, such as Jamaat-i-Islami
had opposed the creation of Pakistan.5 These elites are also the proponents of
Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan (outlined above). This elite consists
of the senior military leadership, federal bureaucrats, including many mohajirs,
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traditional Punjabi and Sindhi landowners, and more recently, the emerging man-
ufacturing sector.6 While often mischaracterized as westernized, the elite shares
a technocratic perspective, meaning that Islam is pragmatically bent to fit the
developmental, technical, and diplomatic needs of the state.7 In effect, Islamic
Pakistan welcomes Western aid and trade, has unlinked its nuclear weapons pro-
gram with any broader Islamic goal, and has secured close relations with ‘athe-
ist’ China.8 The July 2007 assault on the Islamist-held Red Mosque by the
Special Services Group (SSG), the army’s main commando force, in response to
Chinese concerns is indicative of this commitment to technocracy. The business
(and military) elite is primarily focused on local manufacturing and textile
exports, and exerts no interest to improve trade with Afghanistan.9
The second grouping of interests is the ethnic minorities of the Baloch and
the Pakhtun. The Baloch, a minority in their own province of Baluchistan, have
traditionally benefited from Afghan support for their nationalist aspirations
against what they perceive as Punjabi domination of Pakistan. In the past they
have relied on Afghanistan for arms and sanctuary, though their relative influ-
ence on Pakistan’s policy is very limited.10 In contrast, the Pakhtun have sub-
stantial influence on Pakistan’s Afghan policy. The Pakistani Pakhtun (number-
ing 35 million), whose ethnic kin constitute half of Afghanistan’s population, can
be sub-divided into two further groups.11 The settled Pakhtun of the Northwest
Frontier Province (NWFP) were traditionally over-represented in the British
India Army and by the 1960s were over-represented among Pakistan’s senior
military elite (constituting 22-25 percent of the officer corps, as compared with
70 percent being Punjabi in the late-1970s).12 While initially opposed to the for-
mation of Pakistan and assertive in their national identity the Pakhtun of the
NWFP have become strong supporters of Pakistan as they have developed eco-
nomically.13 A second grouping of Pakhtun are those that inhabit the autonomous
tribal areas. They tend to share close relations with tribal members on the Afghan
side of the border but they value their local autonomy more highly than either
Afghan or Pakistan nationality. They have historically resisted incursions by both
states. Conservative social values in both groupings of Pakhtun have set positive
conditions for the support of Islamist movements, though marginally more
among the tribal populations. Since the 1970s, the Pakistani state has encouraged
Islamist political parties to counter balance the strong nationalist aspirations in
the NWFP.
Pakhtun interests are expressed through the nearly independent Afghan
policy of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), where the Pakhtun are also sub-
stantially over-represented (constituting between 30-40 percent of its personnel).
The mainly ethnically Punjabi military has directed more than one purge of the
ISI since the early 1990s to attempt to maintain control over it.14 The ISI is also
strongly supportive of Islamist agents based on its war experience in
Afghanistan, Kashmir, and against Shia and Baloch Pakistanis.15 The result is
that the Pakhtun-influenced ISI is interested in establishing an Islamist Pakhtun
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authority in Kabul regardless of the larger goals of the Pakistani state or the
effects on its relations with NATO. A rational Pakistan policy would be one that
sought a friendly Afghanistan, thereby reducing Kabul’s support for separatist
tendencies among the Pakistani Pakhtun. Since Pakhtun governments in Kabul
inevitably need Pakhtun tribal support to counter balance the Tajik, Uzbek,
Farsiwans, and Hazara Afghans, they inevitably seek to mobilize tribal support
by scapegoating Pakistan and by declaring support for separatist Pakhtun within
the tribal frontier.16 Pakistan should therefore sponsor a non-Pakhtun regime in
Kabul which would have no interest in mobilizing the Pakhtun.  
This was precisely the policy of Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto (a non-Islamist Sindhi) in 1973 when he supported a broad coalition of
Islamists to counter the Kabul government, including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (a
Pakhtun) as well as Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Massoud (both
Tajik).17 After the failure of an abortive uprising by Islamists in Afghanistan in
1975, the Pakhtun-dominated ISI favored Hekmatyar over the others and Afghan
policy was thereafter distorted by Pakhtun rather than broader Pakistani or
Punjabi-Sindhi interests.18 Nevertheless, Pakistan President General Zia ul-
Haq’s strategy was to fragment Afghanistan rather than permit it to become unit-
ed under an ethnically Pakhtun Taliban, which occurred during the tenure of
Benazir Bhutto’s government in 1996.19
One tempting NATO strategy is the promotion of democracy in Pakistan to
neutralize the supposed military influence that is driving the Islamist Afghanistan
policy in Islamabad. However, the reintroduction of civilian-led government in
Pakistan, whether the People’s Party of Pakistan (PPP) shadowed by Asi Ali
Zardari or Nawaz Sharif’s Muslim League (ML), both of which ruled in the
1980s and 1990s, will not likely produce a dramatic change in Pakistan’s Afghan
policy. Benazir Bhutto (of the PPP) was effectively sidelined in 1988 and 1989
when the ISI initiated operations in Kashmir and Sharif was perhaps aware but
powerless to interfere with the Military Intelligence agency’s (MI) operation in
Kargil in 1999. Not since the period of 1971 to 1977 under Benazir’s father,
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, or near the end of Nawaz Sharif’s last-term months in office
in 1999, were civilian leaders sufficiently strong to challenge the military in for-
eign policy. The conditions during the earlier period were the after effects of mil-
itary defeat in East Pakistan that destroyed the public legitimacy of the army
leadership. During the latter period, Nawaz Sharif was gradually co-opting the
military’s religious support base.20 Pervaiz Musharraf has maintained the mili-
tary’s background influence on policy through his own presidential office, the
National Security Council that is currently headed by him, and the military’s
intelligence agencies. The current conditions do not exist for the civilian politi-
cal parties to challenge their exclusion by the military from Pakistan’s
Afghanistan policy. 
Furthermore, periods of direct military rule in Pakistan are associated with
stable relations with neighbors because the military is primarily concerned with
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healthy economic growth to maintain its defense budget rather than confronta-
tion. Pakistan’s foreign policy is most volatile during periods of hybrid civilian-
military rule, either when declining military rule is incorporating civilian stake-
holders to maintain its public legitimacy or when weak civilian regimes seek mil-
itary support to remain in power. The 1965 and 1971 wars with India demon-
strate the former and Pakistan’s support to Kashmir in 1989 and the Kargil
episode demonstrate the latter.21 In both instances the normal civil-military deci-
sion-making process is circumvented by particularist interests, making an accu-
rate assessment of any policy choice deficient.22
Were President Pervaiz Musharraf to suffer a sufficient drop in popularity
that his military and traditional elite backers withdraw their support, leaving him
in direct competition with the traditional civilian parties, then he may be com-
pelled to seek support by propounding more extreme, perhaps Islamist, policies.
Were a weak PPP or ML coalition to emerge, they may come to rely on the same
radical groups to offset or co-opt military influence. In either case foreign poli-
cy would become diversionary and scapegoat foreign threats to sustain public
legitimacy. It is particularly during these periods of hybrid rule that regional
interests, in Kashmir and the NWFP, evade central control and assert independ-
ent local foreign policies, including military adventurism (as occurred in the
1990s in both Afghanistan and Kashmir). The most stable regime would there-
fore either be a direct military or strong civilian government.
Pakistan’s Reluctance to Change Policy
Pakistan’s elite fears that suppressing militant Islam would weaken the
core ideology of the state, alienate key private backers in Saudi Arabia and the
Emirates, prove costly in its enforcement, and irreversibly extinguish a ready
reserve of holy warriors that have proved very useful for Pakistan’s security
against India and Afghanistan. Each of these issues is addressed in turn.
Pakistan depends on a mohajir-inspired nationalist Islam for legitimacy
and to counterbalance centrifugal ethnic sentiments as well as to shield the
underlying ethnic nature of the essentially Punjabi-run state.23 To counterbal-
ance emerging leftist movements in the 1970s and Shi’a activism of the 1980s
the military incorporated conservative (rather than radical) religious representa-
tives within its governing structure.24 Pakistan is approximately 80 percent
Sunni. The remainder, including the founder of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali
Jinnah, is Shi’a. Most Pakistanis are Hanafi Sunnis, though the Barelvi tradition
of saint-worshipping common among 15 percent of the Sunni population is
practiced by a majority of Pakistanis.25 The Barelvis are opposed by the more
fundamentalist Hanafi Deobandi, who also constitute 15 percent, and the pri-
marily Gulf-funded Wahhabists and Salafists.26 Poverty and lack of state capac-
ity explains to some extent the increased prominence of religious schools
(madrassas), most of which preach non-violence, as well as their radicalization
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away from Urdu arts and towards Deobandi, Salafist, and Wahhabist teaching.27
While the Deobandi movement, which was the primary ideological influence on
the Taliban, was founded as a reaction to British occupation in 1867, it (and the
Salafists) had no history of radical militancy prior to deliberate ISI encourage-
ment during the Afghanistan war against Soviet occupation.28 Despite the dis-
ruptive increase in Islamist terrorism in Pakistan as a result of its support for mil-
itant Islamist groups, it is not clear that this would not have been caused anyway
by the scale of Gulf funding directed at Pakistan following the Iranian
Revolution.29
The Pakistan military, as well as the Muslim League and other parties that
have had close political association with clerics, are reluctant to undermine Saudi
diplomatic and financial support by blocking private funding of Deobandi,
Wahhabist, and Salafist religious movements in Pakistan and Afghanistan, par-
ticularly the Taliban.30 The degree of Saudi influence is demonstrated by the fact
that Pakistan sought their permission before detonating its nuclear device.
However, it should be highlighted that a great deal of Islamist funding also has
its origins in the westernized diaspora.31 This pressure from Saudi Arabia has not
however inhibited Pakistan from blocking jihadists from deploying into China’s
predominantly Muslim province of Xinjiang.32 This suggests that Pakistan is cer-
tainly in a position to suppress some of the aspirations of its Islamist groups,
given sufficient incentive.
Pakistan’s passivity is also reinforced by the cost of an intervention of suf-
ficient scale to dominate the tribal areas, which in its worst manifestation, could
result in the equivalent of the 1897 Great Tribal Revolt that preoccupied the
British.33 Militarily suppressing the Taliban may provoke the Pakhtun, given the
difficulty of disentangling tribal from religious sentiments in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and inflame areas within the NWFP.34
Furthermore, any intervention would likely have only a marginal effect on the
strength of the Taliban given the importation of weapons from Central Asia and
reliance on Afghan drug production.35
As long as Afghanistan retains the possibility of encouraging a secession-
ist revolt among the Pakistani Pakhtun tribes with which it maintains contact,
Pakistan has an incentive to preserve an Islamist counterbalance.36 One Pakistani
concern is that, if the Islamists are suppressed, they may not only be supplanted
by Pakhtun nationalists, but they may be more difficult to resurrect. Among the
Pakhtun in particular, Pakhtunwali culture has traditionally been more influential
than Islam, and Taliban successes in pushing Salafist tenets among the Pakhtun
were transient.37 During the Afghanistan War, to avert a subsequent Pakhtun
uprising, the ISI resisted the CIA’s policy of widely distributing weapons and
instead channeled the weapons to seven primarily Islamist groups that were still
never reliably under Pakistan’s control.38 Currently most tribal Pakhtun leaders
support a form of Pakhtun autonomy within Pakistan (Pashtunkwa), but there are
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nevertheless substantial tribal factions that have pretensions towards an inde-
pendent Pakhtunistan.39
Pakistan’s Strategy and a NATO Response
Some have suggested a grand bargain in which Afghanistan, along with
key Pakhtun political parties, would recognize the Durand Line in exchange for
Pakhtun autonomy within Pakistan and an open border concept, as well as guar-
anteed trade and transit access to the Indian Ocean. In this scenario China would
be encouraged by the United States to prod Pakistan into agreement.40 This pro-
posal is unlikely for three reasons. First, the US does not have the necessary
influence and neither Saudi Arabia nor China has the interest to pressure Pakistan
into conciliation with Afghanistan. Second, Afghanistan is too unstable to pro-
vide convincing treaty commitments to Pakistan, especially in promising not to
stoke secessionism. Third, Pakistan recognizes that NATO’s interest in
Afghanistan is weaker than its own interest, and it is just a matter of time before
NATO’s resolve weakens. 
The normalization of Afghan-Pakistan relations in 1963 was attained by
coercive sanctions and threats of military punishment (in 1959 Pakistan had
claimed that it could seize Kabul in a few days).41 Pakistani threats to use mili-
tary force in the present are likely to provoke a strong counter-threat by NATO.
Furthermore, if Pakistan was to carry out any ground force-delivered punitive
attack on Afghanistan, except from routes near Quetta and Peshawar, it would be
substantially delayed and weakened by the need first to pacify the tribal belt to
secure its supply lines. Air attacks are also unlikely given Pakistan’s decisive
weakness in this area compared to NATO, which can deploy substantial naval air
power in the Gulf and the Arabian Sea. Pakistan would be aware that security
guarantees from China would not be valid under these circumstances. Arguably
Pakistan’s interdiction of Afghan transit trade remains an effective threat because
NATO has not yet adopted policies seeking to resolve the trade impasse.
However, the low salience of the trade issue may also be because Afghanistan’s
legitimate trade activity is below what it was during the mid-twentieth century,
when trade embargos had more substantial impact. So Pakistan’s most effective
option is a do-nothing strategy, which imposes a cost on the Kabul regime, pro-
vides plausible deniability to the Islamabad government regarding the actions of
Pakhtun insurgents operating from the frontier area, and provides a force-in-
being for future intervention.
So what are NATO’s options? NATO’s goal of developing Afghanistan suf-
ficiently to manage its own domestic security (with external funding) to stan-
dards of the 1960s is perhaps a decade off, especially if it continues along its rel-
atively tempered developmental plan. Since the nineteenth century, Kabul has
never been able to maintain internal order without external financing.42
Afghanistan’s ability to manage its external threats is forever beyond its reach
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given the relative size of its neighbors and is dependent entirely on alliance secu-
rity currently provided by NATO. NATO has few non-escalatory military
options. Inviting greater Indian participation, re-routing trade through Iran, push-
ing the self-determination of the Pakhtun or Baloch people, or engaging in
assorted uninvited cross-border activity (ground reconnaissance, air strikes, or
ground raids) will likely provoke Pakistan to retaliate through its agents in
Afghanistan. Consequently, direct cross-border occupation will almost certainly
be met with limited army resistance. NATO has two remaining venues of influ-
ence. First, NATO’s presence acts as a restraint on Afghan provocation of seces-
sionism, thereby satisfying one of Islamabad’s goals. Second, NATO could offer
positive trade and aid incentives to Pakistan to very gradually withdraw its sup-
port to those elements of its society that foment Pakhtun insurgency in
Afghanistan (and Pakistan). The long-term effect of such a strategy would be a
gradual economic integration and normalization of the Afghan and Pakistan fron-
tier areas, reinforced by NATO’s restraint against any irredentist temptations in
Kabul.
Julian Schofield is Associate Professor of political science at Concordia
University, Montreal.
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